The Steps Towards Expulsion: The Rise and Fall of Populist Mohammad Mosaddeq During the Iran Coup
Prior to the Cold War, the United States, in comparison to its European counterparts, was seen as an ally of the blossoming democratic movements developing throughout the Middle East during early and mid 20th century. The Truman administration, analogous to the President Woodrow Wilson’s presidency and his historic fourteen points speech, saw a post war world as one where western nations took under their wing and influence, the growing movements of democratic representation all across the globe. However, after the election of General Eisenhower in November of 1952, we see the abrupt growth of the shadow state, the role of the CIA, and a a sharp change in America’s foreign policy within the Middle East, and in particularly Iran, within a matter of a few short weeks. As we will see, this abrupt change will result in the US support and directive in a coup. That would eventually take down the democratically elected Prime Minister of Iran, Mohammad Mosaddeq, and a damming shift in the United States’ perception throughout the Middle East. Positioning America as a onetime beacon of hope into a colonizer, a suppressor of Arab and Persian nationalism, and an overthrower of democratically elected governments.
Western colonization and its influences could be found throughout the globe during the 20th century and specifically in the shattered and congealed states throughout the Middle East. Though the nation of Iran found itself under control by the Iranian monarch, headed by Shah Muhammad Reza, it too was still under the occupying forces of European influence. Iran however, was in an interesting position compared to its neighbors. By sharing a boarder with Russia, it was one of the only Middle Eastern states not under the direct control of either or both of the English or French governments. Instead Iran was characterized as under “Anglo-Soviet occupation.” Sitting upon the blurred Cold War containment walls, until the Spring of 1946, when the Soviet Union, under influence by the United Nations, withdrew troops from the northern providences of Iran, now encompassed by the boarders of Azerbaijan. This precarious position as a boarder straddler placed Iran in the middle of the early stages of the Cold War.
While the inexperienced Shah, described by “intelligence personnel as weak, indecisive and lacking in popular support,” attempted to rule under the multi directional forces of the English, Soviets, and eventually the United States. The political organization, the National Front lead by Mohammad Mosaddeq, simultaneously was pushing for liberal democratic secular reforms to the Majlis, the reduction of the Shah’s power, and pan-Iraniansim. Mohammad Mosaddeq and his followers, found the Shah to essentially be a puppet of the English, who enabled the systematic theft of the Iranian people’s wealth, via the legal monopolization of Iran’s oil by the English petrol company, Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC).sic Mosaddeq and his followers set out to transfer the “political power from the royal court to the parliament,” known as the Majlis and nationalize the Iranian oil fields. With the support of the urban lower and middle classes, artisans, rank and file clergy, anti Soviet intellectuals and general secularist, the National Front led demonstration after demonstration in Tehran against the communist Tudeh party, the Shah, and the role of British influence in the national politics.sic And with early proof of an attempt to rig the 1949 Majlis elections by the Shah, the National Front and its member gained multiple seats in the parliament. With traction, the coalition was able to push for their two goals; the nationalization of the oil fields and the reduction of the aristocracy’s power. By March 1951, Mossadeq himself was able to submit and pass the nationalization bill and through democratic pressures assume the role of Prime Minister on April 29th, 1951.
While the democratic sentiments of the nationalization bill can be seen with its vast appeal among the urban lower and middle classes Iranians. The affect of this bill and its passage will go on to radically reshape Iran politically, and surprisingly drag it farther and further away from its emerging democratic culture. In the short term the results lead to rioting and protesting, and within just over a year galvanized sections of society pushing forth militarized efforts to unseat the nation’s first “democratically” elected and populace prime minister. What must be asked is, with such overwhelming support from the people, and for a person who was considered by many as the, “incorruptible voice of national aspirations.” how did Mosaddeq position fall so quickly? Was it really just due to his quintessential political ideal, the nationalization of the country’s oil fields, and subsequently people were opposed to it or where there other interests, in the background, involved?
While India may have been England’s jewel in the crown, Iran and it’s vast oil reserves, were certainly the fuel that powered the crown throughout the 1930s and 40s. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, (AIOC) a private for profit enterprise held heavily by the English treasury, discovered and exploited Iran’s natural oil reserves. Considered at the time the world’s third largest oil reserve. In addition to controlling the resources, the AIOC constructed the world’s largest oil refinery, and would go on to turn Iran into the second largest exporter of oil in the world by 1950. The British navy relied on 85% of of its fuel directly from the AIOC and received steep discounts on its purchases. By 1951 a new set of revisions and agreements were being drawn up between the Iranian government and AIOC.
Unsurprisingly, like most colonizing corporate charters and states, the new terms of the agreement were just as unfavorable as the old ones. In comparison to 50/50 profit sharing deal between Venezuela and the United States. The AIOC deal would increase, however small, profit sharing from 17 to 24%, and removal fees of four to six shillings per ton of crude.sic The profit sharing revenues weren’t the only gripe. In terms of workers, many felt they were being treated unfairly. While AIOC created nearly 75,000 jobs with nearly 70,000 of them going directly to Iranian citizens, the majority of the top pay skilled jobs, were held onto by English foreign nationals. In addition, AIOC continued to refuse to set a date on when they would begin training Iranians for these high skilled high paying jobs. sic The average Iranian also felt the brunt of these unfair deals. Iranian oil would continue to be sold at international prices, essentially pushing the price of local made fuel up drastically. Also, AIOC was seen not just as a manipulator of the Majlis but also local governments and municipalities. sic
The AIOC’s terms continued to enflame the support for the growing nationalization movement, Mosaddeq, and the National Front. Even Standard oil executive Max Thornburg, who was hired by the Iranians for advisement, suggested the deal was to convoluted that, “no one in the world,” would sign it. While the AIOC characterized the 50/50 deal as, “uneconomical, absurd, and astronomical” to its British cabinet. While Britons ambassador to Iran, Sir Francis Sheppard, stated directly to the Iranian premier that the deal was, “greedy.” sic
While the possibility of nationalization seemed like a rogue idea to the British at first. Their unrelenting opposition to more favorable terms, the Supplementary Agreement, fueled National Front support in the Majlis. Though the party only held a handful of seats at the time, the toxicity in association with the proximity to the AIOC made passing the nationalization bill and Mosaddeq’s rise to prime minister enabled even faster. His strength against the perceived colonial power and his subsequent mobilization of the three underclasses against the upperclass, which many saw to include or be beholden to British colonial rule, swag the public’s opinion in his favor.
As the the nationalization bill passed and Mosaddeq rose to power the English deep state was forced into a precarious position. As mentioned prior, Iranian oil fueled the English empire abroad and at home, and without the Iranian oil fields AIOC and Britian’s control over the Middle Eastern oil markets would be under deep threat. Mosaddeq knew if he was going to achieve his policy of “negative equilibrium,” which was the removal of concessions that heavily favored foreign powers over the Iranian state just has his predecessors had done before, he was going to have to commit to the expulsion of the entirety of the British government from Iran. With the passage of the nationalization bill, the race was on and the prize was clear, control.
As the British government weighed their options going forward, there were a few debates and opinions being expressed associated with nationalization on the side of the western powers. Primarily the fear that began to set into the large multinational oil corporations who feared repercussions across the Middle East and in particular Latin America. Nationalization possed a threat to the deep interests of these organizations. If the Iranian experiment was to be successful, it was possible that subsequent nationalizations could occur throughout the developing world. Just as the United States’ 50/50 deal with Venezuela influenced Iran in their negotiations with the AIOC, so to could the potential of Iran’s national experiment. Representatives from Standard Oil and Socony Vacuum both contacted the State Department stating that, “if nationalization pays off in Persia it would have disastrous effects.” While oil execs were quite clear on their stance towards nationalization, English and American diplomats continue to engage with Mossadeq. Britain took up the stance of prolonging discussions for an indefinite time. The Majlis was not known to be the most stable of governments throughout the 1940s. With the state normally dominated by the Shah until subsequent bills passed in 1952, which diminished his power and establish the control of the military under the broadening roles of Prime Minister Mossadeq, previous ministers held on to their position for an average of just ten months. If Britain could just wait out the administration due to inexperience or a loss of favorability, Britain may find is much more easier to work with the next administration.
Stalls in discussions would occur on and off throughout 1952 and 1953 as Britain positioned itself behind closed doors in an attempt to undermine the foreign prime minister. With an end goal of ousting Mossadeq, Britain’s siege on Mossadeq’s credibility would become multi faceted. First, Britain began an economic war on Iranian interests. While appealing to it allies, Britain placed an embargo on the exports of, “iron, steel, sugar, and oil processing equipment” to Iran and began to take, “legal action against anyone buying Iranian oil.” sic This threat of an embargo place Iran into a precarious position. With reduced exports and surely put a strain on the nation’s economic well being but at the same time the potential for higher profits in the future and economic sustainability seemed all to certain. In the mean time, with its number purchasers of oil plotting to over throw its own government, Iran turned towards Japan and Italy to sell its resources. Though in a “desperate” position, Iran would sustain off it continued production of agriculture and non oil related goods. sic
Mossadeq continued past the 10 month mark that so many of his predecessors had failed to succumb, and though those times were tough, especially for the thousands of employees laid off by the AIOC, the prime minister continue to gain headway in public and media support past this record point. With Mossadeq continuing to gain in power and control over the Iranian state oil supplies, the control of British state and its influence on the oil markets was in a period of waining. The deep state was in much needed action. Besides the observable public battling over headlines across the international newspaper scene, MI6, the British state offices in addition to the United States’ CIA state offices took upon the task of discrediting Mossadeq and his political stances, the National Front, and the increased democratic reaches of the Majlis through a litany of back door deals and media propaganda.
The Iranian coup itself took on more than just the public battling of ideas. A coup d’état requires the secrecy of a spy novel and the bombastic blow to the establishment similarly to any good Bond movie, and Iran itself was certainly no different. Mossadeq was aware of what was occurring in the background just like another good head of state would. By November 1st 1952, Mossadeq forced the British state to leave Tehran, and on that morning with their tales between their legs British state officials bored up shop and left their embassy. In their forceful departure the Brits were codified in their need to oust Mossadeq. Doubling down, British heads of state like Christopher Woodhouse, began to secretly back candidates in the Majlis that had favorable opinions of the British and could potentially support the end to nationalization come the removal of the prime minister. As the British departed Tehran their existing operations continued. For some time the British had been grooming Fazlollah Zahedi, the former Iranian General and active Senator, the role of visible coup leader. Zahedi had been a former support and cabinet member of Mossadeq prior to his very public split in 1952. Zahedi’s inner knowledge of the affairs of the National Front and his personal relationship with Mossadeq place him into a position of extreme insider knowledge and the where-withal of the inner workings of the Mossadeq administration, his possible responses to a coup, and in a strong position amongst the officer corps.
The CIA’s involvement within the Iranian plot is very interesting. Originally, the CIA formed under the Truman administration in the late 1940s, during a time of growing Soviet and Cold War relevance. Truman had been strongly opposed to nation-building during his time in office, and consistently used the power of his office and the growing American super power position, to promote the growth of democratic institutions all throughout the free world. Iran was seen as no different. Truman’s position on Iran throughout his administration was two fold, not cease the functioning of the existing oil markets and to not weaken the Mossadeq administration. While Truman was fearful of the growth of communism, in particular in a state like Iran who shares a boarder with the USSR. Countless reports came out of the weaken position of the Tudeh Party in Iran in the later half of the 1940s and early 1950s. While in office, several heads of the CIA were found to be aligned with the British state position of toppling the Mossadeq administration. While true, Truman had multiple times prevented war between the two nations. Via direct diplomacy, Truman took multiple phone calls directly from Mossadeq, guaranteeing his safety and a lack of American involvement.
Truman’s stance was all well and good until his time in office ended in January of 1953 when General Eisenhower was elected to office. Not opposed to the idea of a coup, nor change the structure of the already establish Iranian CIA division former operations director Kermit Roosevelt, original American supporter, formulator of the coup, and Washington lawyer for AIOC, got the okay from the Eisenhower administration to move forward on the removal of Mosaddeq. The CIA under the guise of the American state, had the legality to run operations within Iran, as opposed to the English who had been removed the year prior. Roosevelt took over the existing structure and contacts of the MI6. Flooding Zahedi and his developing militia with arms and money. In addition to the direct support of Zahedi, the CIA developed a new operation called operation BEDAMN. The main objective of this new outfit was to discredit Mosaddeq and the National Front. Using their contacts inside of local, national, and international media companies, BEDAMN flood newspapers, magainze, and radio airwaves with progranda disparaging the administration in all sorts of ways. What appeared to have been the most effective was aligning Mosaddeq with the Tudeh Party, Iran’s small communist party.
Overtime Mosaddeq’s position and control, not just over Iran’s nationalized oil infrastructure but the inner workings of the military, parliament, and the executive branch began to weaken. The officer corps, aligning with General Zahedi move away from the state as of the result of a perceived alignment with the Communists. CIA propaganda spread rumors about members of parliament and their extramarital affairs in addition to the splits within the part formed over the years by paid of politicians, while Mosaddeq saw foreign sanctions crippling the weak tax base and unpaid for progressive programs taken on during the populace period. The end result, as history has shown, was a short bloody coup the end in the house arrest of former Prime Minister Muhammad Mosaddeq shortly after the beginning of the August 15th coup.
Given today’s state of American super power dominance, it’s not all to surprising to think that at some point in the past that American foreign intelligence agencies were novice, to some extent, at foreign involvement. What is surprising is that the practice round was not part of some far fetch developing communist government in eastern Europe. Instead it was a member of the, “axis of evil” who even more surprisingly was for a brief moment, running on the notions of democratic populism. The 1953 Iranian coup was just another, on a growing list, of toppled anti-colonial political movements, but for the United States it was the first time the state had overthrown a democratic government and for all things, oil interests. While the following year during the Eisenhower administration, again, another government was overthrown in the name of anti-communism. The over through of the Iranian government for capitalistic oil interests is pretty damning itself but the toppling of a democratic government to do so and they define it as an anti communist plot, is just to damming for any sensible person.
Sources:
Abrahamian, Ervand. “The 1953 coup in Iran.” Science & Society (2001)
Cleveland, William L., and Martin Bunton. A history of the modern Middle East. Westview Press, 2016.
Gasiorowski, Mark J. “The 1953 coup d’etat in Iran.” International Journal of Middle East Studies 19, no. 03 (1987)
Keddie, Nikki R. “Iranian revolutions in comparative perspective.” The American Historical Review 88, no. 3 (1983)
Roberts, Mervyn. “Analysis of Radio Propaganda in the 1953 Iran Coup.” Iranian Studies 45, no. 6 (2012)
